Dolphin Airlines: Expansion
By Ellis M. Chernoff
Dolphin Tails, Part Two
In 1982, the fleet expanded one plane at a time. For each aircraft delivery, a crew of two pilots was sent down to the factory in São Paolo, Brazil, to ferry it to Tampa. However, the Brazilian government required the pilots to obtain visas for entry, and that required proof of round-trip airline tickets! Despite bringing more than $1 million with us to purchase the plane, the government still required us to provide proof of a return ticket.
On one occasion, I left my house in the pre-dawn hour to find the air warm and unusually moist, like putting my head inside the mouth of a lion. It was a 20-minute drive to the office at Tampa International Airport. By the time I arrived, the wind was blowing a gale, and deep water was accumulating on the ground.
This particular morning, I was to drive a rental car with my first officer to Sarasota, where our first leg of the day would originate. It was a harrowing ride as the rain was torrential and the winds were gaining strength. Arriving in Sarasota, the agent advised that we inspect the aircraft VERY carefully. The overnight winds had moved it across the ramp several yards.
Finding no damage through our preflight inspection, we boarded a few passengers for the short first leg to Tampa. The winds aloft were still quite strong, and while being vectored for an approach to runway 18R, the approach controller instructed us to “reduce speed to 250 knots.” This was amusing since the Bandeirante’s maximum red line airspeed was less than that, and we were operating even slower due to the turbulence.
One of the advantages of turboprops, such as the PT-6 and TPE-331, is that they have a BETA range where blade angles can be pilot-controlled to less than flight idle through zero pitch and even reverse pitch. This allows precise ground handling for turns and speed control without constant use of wheel brakes. However, sand and other particles will cause erosion and pitting of the tips and leading edges, which requires frequent attention by maintenance technicians.
Not long into our operation, the director of maintenance complained to our chief pilot that the pilots were using too much reverse. OK, so we will use less BETA and reverse and use more brakes. You can guess the next complaint from the maintenance department; the darned pilots are burning up the brakes, and they cost a lot to replace. When confronted by management, my response was, “What do you want me to do; throw out a grappling hook?” If you want to save money flying airplanes, just park them.

Dan Gradwohl collection.

Dan Gradwohl collection.
At some point during the year, I was brought into the chief pilot’s office on another issue. We were going to lease a couple of Piper PA-31-350 Chieftains until more financing for Embraers could be found. Why me? Well, I had a lot of experience with the type, and I would not only be asked to fly them but to teach the crews and act as a check airman. More piston time was not why I came to Dolphin, but I would help out as requested. If they were going to get these planes, I recommended late-model ones with pilot doors, full commuter options, and modern avionics comparable to what we had in the Bandits. That’s not what they got. Instead, they were early production high-time ships that had operated for years in the UK and had been re-imported.

Photo by Ellis M. Chernoff.
A group of pilots was selected from the seniority list to operate the Chieftain on the TPA-SRQ-MIA route, and I gave them the necessary training, technical materials, and checklists. I soon discovered that the plane had problems, especially with the turbocharging system. In fact, the operation of the Lycoming TIO-540-J2BD was far more complex and demanding than the turbine PT-6. It is a reliable engine provided it is operated consistently and within very defined limitations and settings.
Not to get too technical, but the turbocharging system on this engine operates full-time. Rather than ambient air, the engine is fed compressed air from a compressor driven by an exhaust-driven turbine. The speed of the turbine and compressor is determined by the amount of exhaust gas directed through it or bypassed by the waste gate. The waste gate, in turn, is controlled by two factory-set regulators. If either the wastegate is stuck or the regulators are leaking, the engine will not operate as designed.
Normally, a power setting is made by the pilot, and the regulators maintain that power setting during climb and descent. If the exhaust waste gate does not function, as intended, the engine power goes into what is termed “boot-strap mode,” where HP varies up with increased RPM and down with lower RPM. This was happening with our Chieftan, and maintenance personnel did not understand my repeated write-ups. They also refused to go on a flight where I could demonstrate the abnormality.
I arrived one afternoon, and the plane was in the hangar to address the problem. Several days later, I again arrived to hear the engines at full throttle on the engine run-up pad. I asked what was going on and was told they were “adjusting the newly installed regulator.” I asked, “To what setting? They are supposed to be factory calibrated.” “49 inches of manifold pressure” was the answer I received. I ran to the chief pilot’s office to explain that these folks were going to ruin the engines. I had the Lycoming manuals that clearly showed the maximum manifold pressure for the conditions in Tampa would be 43 inches; 49 inches would only be correct at high altitude on a hot day.
A day later, two of my Chieftain pilots took a load of passengers from Tampa to Miami via Sarasota. On their next takeoff from Miami, the engine finally melted, resulting in an emergency landing. The excessive manifold pressure caused detonation through excessive pressure and temperature. This was predictable and preventable, and luckily did not cause a fatal crash. But too often, some folks cannot accept that a mere pilot might know more than they do with their A&P certificate. In my case, I had worked my way through my pilot training by working on airplanes and engines. I also had a full library of technical materials.
By the end of 1982, I relocated to the new Jacksonville crew base and got back to flying the Bandeirante. As a bonus, I got distance from the maintenance department, who were none too happy that I didn’t make them look good.

One of the enduring issues with commuter airlines was the capacity of the planes to carry full loads of passengers and their baggage. From my first airline, I had learned that the FAA allowed airlines to use average passenger and baggage weights of 160 pounds per person in the summer and 165 pounds per person in the winter. This number was considered to include coats and incidental carry-on items such as purses, attaché cases, and tote bags. We would use 23.5 pounds per piece per checked luggage item. While this might be a valid average for a hundred-seat airliner, it would rarely be accurate on a 6-to-10-seater or even an 18-passenger commuter plane. Yet in the FAA charter, from 1958, they were charged not only to regulate aviation but also to promote its success. So commuter airlines all used these figures and would get away with overloading the planes unless there was an accident, in which case the investigation would reveal the actual total weight aboard.

Photo by Ellis M. Chernoff.
Dolphin had a couple of long routes. Quite often, the fuel required for these flights necessitated restricting the load, and so either confirmed passengers were bounced or their checked luggage would be left behind and go on a later flight to be delivered by a taxi cab. The stations involved in denied boarding and delayed baggage were disadvantaged by negative statistics. This created a situation where a motivation to cheat and lie evolved. Passengers at the counter would be advised to take their luggage through security to the gate rather than check it. The manifest would show two checked bags, yet the large baggage compartment would be full. Sometimes, adults would show on the manifest as children. Station agents do not fall under the supervision of the chief pilot, nor are they certified by the FAA. The Pilot in Command bears full responsibility for the safety and legality of the operation. Again, I had to get involved in this.
To be continued…

















































